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I. INTRODUCTION 
In previous research (Ferejohn et al., 1976, 1977, 1979a, 1979b) we have 
addressed the problem of designing well-behaved choice mechanisms for 
simultaneously purchasing more than one discrete public good from 
among several independent alternatives. A "discrete public good" is a 
public good which is provided in a single, fixed quantity. The initial 
example that motivated our work (see Ferejohn et al., 1976) was the 
selection of roughly 30 television programs of fixed duration and content 
from more than 100 programs that were proposed to public television 
stations. Several other examples are equally germane, such as the se-
lection of research proposals to be supported by a foundation or the 
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decision by partners in a joint oil exploration venture as to the tracts 
in a field on which to bid. In practice, most collective decisions are 
posed as a choice among discrete alternatives to simplify the selection 
process. See Ferejohn et al. (1979b) for more examples. 
This paper develops and compares the performance of four collective 
decision-making procedures for simultaneously determining whether to 
purchase each of several discrete public goods. In all the procedures the 
decisions are based upon voluntary "bids" by members of a collective, 
the sums of which are used to make purchase decisions and allocate cost 
shares. The procedures differ according to the extent to which they 
contain specific rules that partially counteract the "free rider" problem, 
that is, the incentive operating on a member of the collective to misreport 
the intensities of his or her preferences for the various public goods in 
order to minimize the proportion of the costs of the public goods that 
he or she will have to bear. Each of the procedures studied here is based 
upon a set of experimental institutions designed by Vernon Smith to deal 
with a different class of problems: the collective choice of a quantity 
and cost share of a single public good, or the selection of a single, 
discrete public good from among several alternatives. 
The purpose of this research is to examine the performance and im-
plementation features of these institutions when they are applied to the 
problem of simultaneously selecting multiple, discrete public goods. As 
discussed below, these mechanisms possess many Nash equilibria, not 
all of which are efficient. Since economic theory as yet makes no clear-
cut predictions as to which equilibria will be attained, the selection of 
a "satisfactory" decision-making institution may still have an important 
empirical component. Further, the construction of theory in this area 
may be assisted by the development of reliable empirical generalizations 
about the sorts of Nash equilibria that tend to be chosen. For the purpose 
of generating such empirical information, a series of small-group exper-
iments was performed in which the details of the procedures were sys-
tematically varied. 
Because of potential variation in environments, it seems plausible that 
some significant alterations in Smith's procedures may be necessary if 
his mechanism is to perform successfully in simultaneously selecting 
multiple public goods. Thus, systematic variation was introduced for two 
parameters of the experimental environment-the experience of the sub-
jects and the extent of variation in their rank orderings of alternatives. 
Because marketlike mechanisms for collective decisions are novel and 
quite complex, experience could be an important factor in determining 
the performance of these procedures in an experimental setting. More-
over, the complexity of the decision problem can be affected by the 
preferences of the members of the collective. If experimental subjects 
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are roughly in agreement about which public goods should be selected, 
the main problem they face in any decision-making environment is how 
to share costs. Subject groups with more heterogeneous tastes face the 
additional coordination problem of overcoming comparatively stronger 
disagreements on what should be purchased, as well as how it should 
be paid for. 
This paper is organized as follows. The next section contains a brief 
description of the literature relating to the research in this paper, in-
cluding a formal statement of the procedures examined herein. Section 
III describes the experiments that we have performed, and Section IV 
reports the results. Section V provides some incomplete analysis of why 
the procedures may have differed in their performance in the manner 
reported in Section VI. 
II. ALLOCATION MECHANISMS FOR DISCRETE 
PUBLIC GOODS 
Tideman and Tullock (1976) applied the Clarke-Groves "demand-re-
vealing mechanism" to the problem of specifying incentive-compatible 
mechanisms for choosing among discrete alternatives. Unfortunately, as 
shown by Hurwicz (1975) and Green and Laffont (1976), this mechanism 
will not choose Pareto-optimal alternatives due to the fact that the pro-
ceeds collected from individuals will not, in general, exactly offset the 
cost of providing the public goods. 
Thus, to construct mechanisms that will perform "well" in ~electing 
among discrete public goods requires that certain trade-offs be made 
among various design criteria. In particular, the attractive property of 
"incentive compatibility" 1 appears to be inconsistent with various other 
desirable properties. The next logical step, designing mechanisms in 
which efficient allocations are supported by a Nash equilibrium, has 
already been pursued. 
In a stimulating series of papers, Vernon Smith (1977, 1978, 1979, 
1980) has proposed several variants of what he calls the auction mech-
anism for acquiring public goods. In the auction mechanism the agents 
submit bids indicating their desired quantity of a single public good and 
the cost shares they would accept. If all the agents agree on the quantity 
to be provided and on their cost shares, then the public good is provided 
at the indicated level and with the accepted cost shares. Otherwise, the 
public good is not produced. 
Smith's auction mechanism, with its requirement that agents unani-
mously agree to the public good quantity and cost shares, provides a 
partial remedy for the incentive to underreport. Even if everyone else 
agrees on a quantity and a distribution of cost shares, the failure of just 
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one agent to agree causes no public good to be provided. Smith's mod-
ification of the Lindahl mechanism has the property that some efficient 
allocations are supported by equilibria. Smith (1979) has reported ex-
periments on such processes for environments with one private good 
and a single public good which can be provided in various integer 
amounts. He found that in the absence of income effects, the auction 
mechanism typically provided a quantity of the public good which was 
consistent with an efficient allocation (although there was usually a rev-
enue surplus), and that agents' bidding behavior could be accounted for 
by a model predicting that on the final round each agent bids the Lindahl 
price for the public good. These results are somewhat surprising because 
the auction mechanism used by Smith has many (Nash) equilibrium 
strategy configurations, only one of which involves agents bidding their 
Lindahl prices. 
In another paper, Smith (1977) proposed an auction election mechanism 
for an environment in which there are several mutually exclusive public 
goods and one private good. Smith found that this mechanism usually 
chose the "correct" public good (the one maximizing net willingness to 
pay). Again, these results are difficult to explain because numerous other 
equilibria exist in which an alternative public good is selected. 
One possible explanation for Smith's results is that the preference 
configuration induced by his payoff structure exhibits "natural" agree-
ment points. In other words, because of his choice of experimental 
parameters there is no serious "coordination" problem in his public good 
environments. For example, the net willingness-to-pay function in Smith's 
initial auction mechanism experiments is single-peaked. Consequently, 
the search problem may be especially simple for the agents. Indeed, in 
a recent paper Smith (1980) examined the auction mechanism in an 
environment in which the choice problem was to select a quantity and 
cost shares for one public good and in which preferences exhibited in-
come effects. In these experiments the quantity of public good provided 
was approximately that which corresponds to a Lindahl equilibrium, but 
the allocation of private and public goods departed significantly from the 
Pareto set. 
Thus we may infer from Smith's work that in certain circumstances 
the auction mechanism allows the provision of the Lindahl quantity of 
the public good but that attainment of a Pareto-optimal outcome depends 
in some unexplained way on the particular environment in which it is 
implemented. This paper examines its effectiveness in a variety of en-
vironments and makes an initial effort to explain its successes or failures 
in these environments. 
In private conversation and correspondence Smith has suggested that 
a variant of the auction mechanism be used in experiments which deal 
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with several nonexclusive, discrete public goods. And in a preliminary 
five-person, four-good experiment which he kindly made available to us, 
this proposed variant did achieve an efficient allocation. In view of the 
fact that the experimental institutions we have studied (Ferejohn et al., 
1979a,b) rarely achieve efficient allocations,2 we decided to examine 
closely the auction mechanism with multiple discrete public goods. 
The static form of the auction mechanism for discrete public goods 
may be written as follows. There are n agents and m + 1 commodities, 
the first m of which are discrete public goods and the last of which is 
a divisible private good of which each agent holds an endowment wi. 
Each agent submits a bid, bii, 3 on each of the public goods, and Ci is 
the cost of good j. The set J ~ {l, 2, ... , m} is the set of commodity 
indices for which 2:~~ 1 bii = Ci, and indicates the collection of public 
goods which are to be produced. The i1h agent then is required to pay 
2:.EJbii = LiJCi - Lkfibkj) for the package of produced public goods. 
Each of the agents is assumed to hold a linear preference ordering 
over the commodities. Thus, the i1h individual's preference Ri, between 
the (m + 1) vectors, x = (Xi, ... , Xm, Xm+1) and y = (y., ... , Ym, Ym+1), 
can be represented as a vector vi = (vi., vi2, ... , vim+i) where vim+I = 
1 and xRiy ~ 2:i:~ 1 xivii;:::: 2:im~~ 1 yivii• where Xm+I is the quantity of 
private good and xi = 1 if commodity j = I, ... , m is included in bundle 
x and xi = 0 otherwise. In this case the i1h individual's marginal will-
ingness to pay for good j is represented by vii and we further assume 
that Cj > Vij > 0 for all i and j. 
Under the above assumptions it is easily seen that any bid configuration 
for which for all i and for j = I, ... , m 
if Ci - L bki >vii; 
kfi 
otherwise 
is a Nash equilibrium and conversely. Of course, as mentioned earlier, 
there are usually many such equilibria, including the configuration 
bii = 0 for all i and j. It can be seen that some of the bid configurations 
of this form support a Pareto-optimal allocation, so that in a weak sense 
the auction mechanism is "weakly incentive compatible." That is, at 
least some Nash equilibria are contained in the Pareto set. 
The critical features of the static auction mechanism are these (Smith, 
1978): 
1. Collective excludability: If the collectivity fails to purchase a com-
modity, each individual is excluded from enjoying it. 
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2. Unanimity: For a commodity to be purchased all individuals must 
bid their cost shares (i.e., bu = Ci - Lk#i bki). 
3. Budget balance: The cost of the purchased commodities equals 
the sum of the bids. 
While these features produce Pareto-optimal Nash equilibria, they also 
possess numerous nonoptimal equilibria as well. Because of the existence 
of multiple equilibria, the agents must have some opportunity to "co-
ordinate" their strategies in such a way that a particular equilibrium can 
be attained. This is achieved by implementing the auction mechanism 
as a dynamic adjustment procedure. 
Several distinct adjustment processes could be interpreted as methods 
which implement the static auction mechanism. We have chosen to work 
with a simple basic adjustment process and to experiment with variations 
in several of its characteristics as suggested by Smith (1980). The pro-
cesses examined in this paper all have the property that for each agent 
the tax assessment does not exceed the initial endowment (nonbank-
ruptcy). To ensure nonbankruptcy, we require that for each agent the 
sum of bids not exceed the agent's initial endowment. 4 Other constraints 
on bids could serve the same purpose, but any such alternative is equiv-
alent to this requirement applied after some redistribution of the 
endowments. 
Steps 1 and 2 describe the canonical adjustment procedure which was 
employed for all the experiments: 
1. In each round t, each agent i submits a bid vector on all com-
modities, (bli. ... , blm) = bl where Lm~i :S Wj. For every commod-
ity, the sum of bids on that commodity is made public at the end 
of the round. The experimenters then indicate which of the com-
modities would be produced if the given bid vector were final (i.e., 
the commodities for which L~~ 1 bli ::=::: Ci). 
2. The process can stop in either of two ways: (a) reach round ten; 
or (b) every agent submits identical bid vectors for two consecutive 
rounds. 
Several alternative allocation rules were appended to the basic adjust-
ment process: 
3a. Voluntary contribution and unanimity procedure: If (bL ... , b~) 
is a final-bid configuration, stopping was achieved by rule 2b, and 
J is the set of commodities to be produced, then the payoff to 
agent i is Lid (vu - bB) + Wj. If stopping was achieved by rule 
2a, then the agent receives a small fixed sum Po· 
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3b. Voluntary contribution procedure: All agents receive 
Ljd (vij - bl) + wi regardless of how the final-bid configuration 
was achieved. 
3c. Rebate and unanimity procedure: If (bl, ... , b~) is the final-bid 
configuration and stopping was accomplished by 2b, then the 
payoff to agent i is 
? (vij - blj) + Wj + ? {"b:b.J t (L btj - cj)} (1) 
Jd jd .L., kj k 
k 
bt· 
= L (vii - " ·b~ tk. Cj) + wi. jd .L., J 
k 
If stopping occurs because of 2a, then the agent received a small 
fixed sum of money Po· 
3d. Rebate procedure: Agents receive payments calculated according 
to (1) regardless of how stopping occurs. 
These adjustment and allocation rules depart from the static auction 
mechanism in several ways. First, for a commodity to be purchased in 
the experiments, we require only that L~~ 1 bij 2'.: Cj, whereas the auction 
mechanism requires equality. Second, the cost share for agent i is then 
either bij 2'.: cj - Lk,.i bkj in 3a and 3b, or bij minus a rebate in 3c and 
3d.5 In the auction mechanism, agents always pay bij = Cj -
Lkfi bkj· Thirdly, the sum of the bids an agent may submit must not 
exceed his budget. 
Allocation rules 3a and 3b are called voluntary contribution procedures 
because they amount to a very common method of cost sharing for public 
goods-the "fund drive." A commodity (a church, recreation center, or 
university research program) can be purchased at some price C. A group 
then inaugurates a campaign to raise the money. If enough money is 
gathered, the commodity is purchased; otherwise the contributions are 
returned to the donors. 
A problem with voluntary contribution procedures is that agents might 
be expected to understate their preferences in part because the procedure 
can produce a surplus and this surplus is simply discarded. Rules 3c and 
3d (rebate procedures) distribute the surplus of bids over costs on each 
commodity to the agents in proportion to their final bids on the com-
modity. This feature is supposed to reduce incentives to understate will-
ingness to pay for the public goods, although it should not be expected 
to eliminate underbidding entirely. Moreover, overbids on a commodity 
are rarely consistent with the existence of a Nash equilibrium in this 
case.6 
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Rules 3a and 3c incorporate the requirement that agents unanimously 
signal their agreement on a proposed allocation by repeating their bids. 
Unless such agreement is explicitly achieved, the agents receive a small 
compensation for their time (p0 = $3.00) and no commodities are pur-
chased. In procedures 3b and 3d no penalty is assessed if unanimous 
agreement is not achieved, and the payoffs are made according to the 
final-bid configuration. 7 
The diversity of dynamic implementations of the auction mechanism 
permits several questions to be addressed. First, how well do any of the 
processes perform in an environment with multiple discrete public goods? 
In particular, are efficient or "nearly" efficient allocations achieved in 
this setting? Second, does the use of the "rebate" rule affect the per-
formance of the mechanisms? Finally, does the use of the unanimity 
requirement affect the performance of the mechanisms? 
Two additional hypotheses are of interest. First, would the unanimous 
agreement experiments (3a and 3c) exhibit less strategic understatement 
of bids (i.e., "free riding") than the other experiments? Second, would 
the voluntary contribution rules (3a, 3b), which confiscate overbids, dis-
courage high bids (relative to 3c and 3d) and therefore inhibit the achieve-
ment of efficient outcomes? There is little theoretical support for any 
particular answer to these questions, but they seem to require some 
response if one is to succeed in implementing procedures of the type 
examined here. 
III. DESCRIPTION OF THE EXPERIMENTS 
The principal purpose of the experiments reported here is to study the 
effect of the different allocation rules given above. In addition to ex-
amining experimental auction processes with each of the allocation rules, 
two additional control variables were introduced. First, two distinctly 
different preference configurations were used. Second, "experienced" 
subjects (subjects who had participated in earlier experiments) were used 
in some of the experiments. 
The two preference, endowment, and cost configurations that were 
employed are given in Tables 1 and 2. The preference configuration in 
Table 2 was employed by Smith (private communication) in a pilot ex-
periment with the auction process for discrete public goods. Table 1 
exhibits more diversity in the relative attractiveness of the alternatives 
among the agents than does Table 2. In Table 2, bundle BCD is weakly 
preferred by everyone and strongly preferred by everyone except agent 
5 to any other feasible bundle. Thus, the principal difference between 
the two configurations is that the location of Pareto-optimal allocations 
seems much more straightforward for the data in Table 2 than for those 
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Table I. 
Agent 
2 3 4 5 Cost 
A 3.00 1.80 2.40 1.20 4.80 6.00 
B 1.20 3.60 6.00 1.80 3.00 9.00 
Commodity c 4.80 8.40 6.60 2.40 5.40 12.00 
D 3.60 6.00 3.60 3.00 7.20 10.50 
E 1.20 5.40 3.60 4.20 1.80 7.50 
Endowment 3.30 8.25 9.90 4.95 6.60 
in Table 1.8 Hence, we shall refer to Table 1 as the "difficult" config-
uration and Table 2 as the "easy" configuration. 
The decision to use experienced subjects was based on practical con-
siderations relating to the possible implementation of procedures of the 
sort examined here. Allocation mechanisms for public goods are suffi-
ciently unfamiliar to most people that they may have to undergo a period 
Table 2. 
Agent 
2 3 4 5 Cost 
A 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 
B 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 4.00 
Commodity 
c 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 6.00 3.00 
D 8.00 6.00 4.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 
Endowment 3.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 
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during which they acquaint themselves with the operation of the pro-
cedures before they fully understand how the mechanism operates. In 
most potential applications the agents will eventually obtain such ex-
perience through repeated participation. Thus, the performance of the 
institutions with experienced subjects may be the more interesting set 
of data. And because very little seems to be known in economic choice 
experiments about these matters, we decided to employ "experience" 
as a control variable. 
Twenty-nine five-person experiments were conducted. The subjects 
were mostly recruited from the undergraduate student populations of 
Caltech and Pasadena City College. In no case were experienced and 
inexperienced subjects mixed. The design of the alternative allocation 
rules proceeded sequentially, and so subjects were not randomly assigned 
to experiments. Table 3 classifies the experiments that were run.9 
The experiments proceeded as follows. The instructions (see Appen-
dix) were read to the subjects and an opportunity was given for questions. 
When the subjects appeared to be familiar with the instructions, they 
were asked to submit a list of bids on the commodities. The bids were 
then collected and the sum of bids on each commodity were posted on 
the blackboard in the front of the room. Although cost information was 
freely available to the subjects, in order to avoid confusion the experi-
menters indicated at the end of each round which commodities, if any, 
Table 3. Design of Experiments* Allocation Rules 
Table 
I 
Preferences 
Table 
2 
Preferences 
Notes: 
rExperienced 
llnexperienced 
[
Experienced 
Inexperienced 
3a 
I 
2 
(!)** 
I 
2 
* Entries are the number of observations in each cell. 
3b Jc 
I I 
2 3 
I (!)** 
I I 
2 2 
** Experiments deleted from analysis due to misunderstanding of instructions by subjects. 
3d 
0 
5 
(2)** 
I 
4 
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had bid sums exceeding purchase cost. The subjects were then asked 
to submit a new set of bids. This procedure was repeated until one of 
the stopping conditions, 2a or 2b, was achieved. 
Once a stopping condition was met, the final payoffs were computed 
according to the particular allocation rule being employed for the ex-
periment. The subjects were then paid in cash and dismissed. 
In the case of 4 of the 29 experiments (marked in Table 3), the ex-
perimenters concluded that one or more of the subjects did not under-
stand the instructions. As one would expect, these experiments involved 
only inexperienced subjects. These cases are eliminated in the following 
analysis to insure that technical defects in communicating the instructions 
do not obscure the results. All the tables reported below were examined 
for the full set of 29 experiments, and any differences in results are noted 
where appropriate. 
IV. THE EFFECTS OF THE ALTERNATIVE 
ALLOCATION RULES ON 
THE PERFORMANCE OF THE EXPERIMENTAL 
INSTITUTIONS 
In an earlier paper (Ferejohn et al., 1979a), total payout to subjects was 
used as the measure of ttie efficiency of an experimental mechanism. We 
are somewhat uncomfortable with this measure because it is an adequate 
index of efficiency only if subjects may make side payments among 
themselves. In particular, the total payout measure is especially sensitive 
to the performance of the institution with respect to the payoffs captured 
by the one or two participants with the biggest stakes in the decision. 
Outcomes with relatively poor performance by this measure may, indeed, 
be on the Pareto frontier because they provide the maximal payout to 
some participants. For this reason, additional indicators of allocative 
efficiency are used here. 
The most direct measure is simply to indicate whether a particular 
experiment terminated at an efficient (Pareto-undominated) allocation. 
Not surprisingly, given the difficulty of the coordination problem faced 
by the subjects, only 6 of the 29 experiments resulted in efficient out-
comes. In several experiments a group chose a package of public goods 
that was consistent with an efficient allocation, but overbid for these 
goods. Given the uncertainty faced by the subjects about how their peers 
would respond to an attempt to reduce overbids, situations with overbids 
seem quite natural. Thus, a second measure of the efficiency of an 
experimental outcome counts an allocation as "efficient" if the only 
allocations dominating it consist of the same public good bundle but with 
different cost-sharing arrangements. This occurs with the voluntary con-
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tribution mechanism if the sum of the bids exceeds the cost. In this 
sense, 5 more "efficient" outcomes (a total of 11) were observed. 
A useful property of a measure of efficiency is that it give some 
indication of how inefficient the inefficient allocations were. One mea-
sure, admittedly ad hoc but easy to compute, is the percentage of the 
number of packages of public goods for which there existed some cost-
sharing arrangement such that each subject could be made better off by 
securing that package. This measure, D, took values between 0 (for 
"efficient" outcomes) and 1.0 (for very inefficient outcomes), with ex-
periments that have lower scores exhibiting better performance than 
those with higher scores. 
Finally, as an alternative measure of efficiency, the percentage of the 
total possible payout to the subjects P is also computed. Whereas this 
measure is subject to the same criticisms as the total payout measure 
discussed above, it coincides fairly closely to the D measure. For ex-
ample, in 5 of the 10 experiments in which the measure D took the value 
of 0 for efficient outcomes, the subjects received 100% of the total pos-
sible payout. In the other 5 experiments, all of which were with the 
voluntary contribution mechanism, the subjects earned at least 83% of 
the total possible payout by purchasing an efficient public good bundle 
but by collectively bidding more than the cost of the bundle. This measure 
takes on values between 0 and 1.0. If the 4 experiments in which we 
suspect that at least one subject failed to grasp the instructions are 
eliminated, the values are between .164 and 1.0. 
Table 4 contains the results of experiments with all six decision-making 
institutions. Results from auction procedures that use inexperienced and 
experienced subjects are pooled in the table. Some experiments involving 
the last two institutions mixed experienced and inexperienced subjects, 
so that the results can not be conveniently divided and compared. 10 
The results in the table motivate the more detailed analysis that follows. 
The results from the four types of auction institutions neatly bracket the 
results of the SPC and pivot procedure, raising the possibility that a 
well-designed version of one of the former could outperform the latter 
two. Second, the particular allocation rule used in an auction procedure 
appears to affect performance. Moreover, there appear to be interaction 
effects between the design of institutions and the heterogeneity of the 
preferences of the group that uses them, as well as other environmental 
features. Unfortunately, the number of experiments is too few and the 
experimental design too sparse to test for these effects. Nevertheless, 
the results in the table are sufficiently striking to bear underlining-as 
well as to justify more experiments. Unanimity appears to do an effective 
job of promoting agreement on a relatively efficient allocation when 
members of the group have heterogeneous tastes, but the straight "char-
...... 
00 
'1 
Table 4. Performancea of Six Institutions 
Heterogeneous Preferencesb Homogeneous Preferencesb 
Number of Number of 
Institution Experiments P-Measure D-Measure Experiments P-Measure D-Measure 
3a. Voluntary Contributions and 
Unanimity 2 .79 .06 3 .80 .08 
3b. Voluntary Contributions 3 .46 .61 3 .99 .00 
3c. Rebate and Unanimity 3 .95 .01 3 .78 .07 
3d. Rebate 3 .49 .61 5 .73 .09 
Station Programming Cooperative 5 .60 .22 
Discrete Pivot10 Procedure 8 .57 .33 
Notes: 
0 P-measure is proportion of maximal total payoff, D-measure is proportion of feasible allocations that Pareto-dominate the final allocation. 
• Heterogeneous preferences are shown in Table I, and homogeneous preferences are shown in Table 2. The Station Programming Cooperative and Discrete Pivot 
Procedures were not run on homogeneous preferences. 
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ity drive"-the classic case for the "free rider problem"-performed 
virtually perfectly when preferences were homogeneous. We have no 
solid explanation for this result. 
To analyze in greater detail the effect of the various institutional and 
environmental factors on performance, the relationship between both of 
the efficiency measures and the various experimental controls was es-
timated using the Tobit method (see Tobin, 1958). 11 This method was 
appropriate because the measures of efficiency are limited dependent 
variables. The results using percent of maximum feasible payout as the 
performance measure are shown in Table 5. These results were obtained 
from using a Tobit procedure with 1 - P as the dependent variable, 
where the lower limit on the observations of this dependent variable was 
taken to be zero. 12 Utilizing the .10 significance level for the two-tailed 
tests, the hypothesis that an independent variable affects performance 
is accepted for three of the four control variables. 
In a Tobit model, the locus of expected value estimates is nonlinear 
and is given by 
E(l - P I X) = B'XQ(B'X/s) + sZ(B'X/s), (2) 
where Q(x) is the value of the cumulative, unit-normal distribution func-
tion at x; Z(x) represents the value of the unit-normal probability function 
at x; and B'X is the product of the coefficient vector with a vector of 
observed values of the independent variable. The estimate of standard 
deviation of the normal random variables with mean zero is s, which is 
Table 5. The Effects of Experimental Controls on 1 - P 
Preferences 
( = 0 if Table 1, 
= 1 if Table 2) 
Unanimous Consent 
(= 1if3.a or 3.c 
= 0 if 3.b or 3.d) 
Experience 
( = 1 if experienced subjects 
= 0 otherwise) 
Rebate 
( = 1 if no rebate 
= 0 with rebate) 
Constant 
Notes: 
* Significant at the .10 level 
** Significant at the .01 level 
B 
-.203* 
(.106) 
- .188* 
(.107) 
-.225* 
(.121) 
.087 
(.103) 
.449** 
(.126) 
N = 25 
s = .245 
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assumed to account for the differences between subject groups which 
are not accounted for in the independent variables (see note 11). 
The effect of the control variables can be calculated from the estimates 
in Table 5 and Equation (2). For example, inexperienced subjects using 
the difficult preference configuration without a unanimous consent rule 
capture, on average, E(P) = (1 - E(l - P)) = 54.8 percent of the total 
possible payout. Imposing a unanimous consent rule on inexperienced 
subjects with the same preference structure increases the expected per-
centage payoff to 72.1 percent. 
While the statistical analysis supports the proposition that experienced 
subjects using the more homogeneous preference configuration (Table 
2) and unanimous consent would operate at almost full efficiency (96.4 
percent), this conclusion is tentative. The small number of experiments, 
especially using experienced subjects, cannot support a statistical test 
for interaction effects. 
Table 6 reports the Tobit estimation results when the measure of 
performance is the percentage of feasible bundles of public goods for 
which there exists a distribution of cost shares such that they Pareto-
dominate the final allocation in the experiment. Since D is also a limited 
dependent variable, this relationship is estimated using a Tobit procedure 
in which D is the dependent variable and has a lower limit of zero. 13 
In this case, the same .three of the four control variables significantly 
affect the performance criterion based on the number of dominating 
allocation. On average, an inexperienced collective with the more het-
erogeneous set of preferences and without the unanimous consent rule 
Table 6. The Effects of Experimental 
Controls on D 
Preference 
Unanimous Consent 
Experience 
Rebate 
Constant 
Notes: 
** Significant at .05 level 
*** significant at .01 level 
B 
- .391 ** 
(.143) 
- .387** N = 25 
(.145) 
- .418** s = .283 
(.168) 
-.044 
(.130) 
.598*** 
(.166) 
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settles on an allocation which is dominated by 59. 9 percent of the feasible 
packages. Alternatively, using the same preferences, an inexperienced 
group which operates under a unanimous consent rule will settle on an 
allocation which is dominated by 24.8 percent of other possible equilibria. 
These regressions suggest that the particular allocation rule utilized 
in implementing an auction mechanism affects its performance. The crit-
ical aspect of the allocation rule is whether the agents are required to 
signal unanimous consent on a final allocation by repeating their bids. 
Whether the overbids are returned to agents (rebate) appears to have 
no affect on performance. 
The two additional control variables, preference configuration and ex-
perience, may also have significant impacts on performance. For all 
institutions, the Table 2 preferences yield somewhat better performance 
than those in Table 1. Somewhat nebulous post hoc examination of the 
histories of the experiments provides a possible explanation for this 
phenomenon. Groups using Table 2 preferences settle more quickly on 
the final list of commodities to be purchased than do the other groups. 
They then devote the remaining rounds to attempts at relatively minor 
adjustments in cost shares. 
Groups of experienced subjects performed better than inexperienced 
groups by one of our efficiency measures. While this result may not be 
a surprise, it seemed to us almost as plausible (before running the ex-
periments) that experienced subjects might be more likely to try to engage 
in strategic behavior to influence the bids of others than would the 
inexperienced subjects, thereby inhibiting institutional performance. 
V. DISCUSSION AND A POSSIBLE 
INTERPRETATION 
While it is of interest to know which characteristics of an institution 
(such as the unanimous consent feature or the presence of rebate) or of 
its environment (experience, preference configuration) affect its perfor-
mance, also of interest is how and why these factors influence outcomes. 
Apparently various aspects of an institution and an environment give 
subjects greater or lesser incentives to stabilize their bids. And in any 
adjustment procedure of the sort studied here, unless agents stabilize 
their bids, the institution evidently cannot end up performing very well. 
Maximum performance is achieved in cases in which agents are able to 
eliminate many alternatives from consideration i::~rly in the process, to 
concentrate bids only on the commodities that eventually turn out to be 
purchased, and to eliminate overbids. 
To examine these ideas empirically, a measure of the volatility of bids 
in an experiment was used as an indicator of how much predictability 
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there was in bidding behavior. The measure utilized was 
1 b l bt-1 
-2: LL _i! - _i!__ = V, 
TNM i t j W; W; 
where T is the number of rounds, N is the number of agents, M is the 
number of goods, and Vis simply the average variation in bids for each 
experiment. The idea is that the various aspects of an institution or its 
environment might affect volatility, which in turn would affect perfor-
mance by affecting coordination possibilities. Alternatively, certain as-
pects of an institution or its environment might directly affect perfor-
mance. A variety of simple recursive systems was estimated in which 
volatility and performance (measured in either of the ways reported in 
the previous regressions) are endogenous variables, but in which vola-
tility is antecedent to performance. Given this conjectured relationship, 
a regression in which volatility is the dependent variable was estimated 
using ordinary least squares. These results are shown in Table 7. 
Table 8 gives the results of regressions in which the percent of total 
possible payout was used as a dependent variable, while Table 9 shows 
the results when the dependent variable is the percentage of feasible 
bundles that Pareto-dominates the final allocation. The relationships pre-
sented in both of these tables were estimated using the Tobit method 
for limited dependent variables. In all cases volatility and preference 
configuration were independent variables. Each of the other three in-
dependent variables was also tried with volatility and performance, as 
shown. 
These results suggest that features of both the environment and the 
institution affect the performance of the auction mechanism for discrete 
Table 7. Effect of Controls on 
Volatility 
Preference 
Experience 
Unanimous Consent 
Rebate 
Constant 
Note: 
** Significant at .05 level 
B 
- .002 
(.009) 
- .019** 
(.01) 
-.018** 
(.009) 
.009 
(.009) 
.074 
R' = .30 
N = 25 
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Table 8. Influence of Volatility on Percentage of Total Possible 
Payout 
Independent 
Variables 
Volatility 
Preference 
Unanimous Consent 
Experience 
Rebate 
Constant 
s 
N 
Notes: 
*** Significant at the .01 level 
** Significant at the .05 level 
1 
-5.767** 
(2.266) 
.152 
(.098) 
.095 
(.106) 
1.013*** 
(.180) 
.229 
24 
Regression Number 
2 
-5.711** 
(2.200) 
.157 
(.097) 
.126 
(.116) 
1.013*** 
(.167) 
.226 
25 
3 
-6.568*** 
(2.184) 
.142 
(.098) 
-.006 
(.097) 
1.114*** 
(.149) 
.233 
25 
4 
-6.581 *** 
(2.169) 
.142 
(.098) 
1.112*** 
(.146) 
.234 
25 
Table 9. Influence of Volatility on Percentage of Feasible Dominating 
Bundles 
Regression Number 
Independent 
Variables 2 3 4 
Volatility 6.680** 7 .157** 9.843*** 9.125** 
(3.008) (3.094) (3.363) (3.272) 
Preference - .334** - .336** -.299* - .292* 
(.140) (.144) (.149) (.150) 
Unanimous Consent - .312** 
(.148) 
Experience - .363* 
(.177) 
Rebate -.172 
(.148) 
Constant -.014 -.090 -.305 -.332 
(.237) (.227) (.221) (.223) 
s .286 .296 .219 .326 
N 24 25 25 25 
Notes: 
*** Significant at the .01 level 
** Significant at the .05 level 
* Significant at the .10 level 
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public goods. Using either performance measure, a decrease in volatility 
significantly improves performance and, from Table 7, we know that 
both the use of experienced subjects and the unanimous consent rule 
significantly decreases volatility. One explanation for this result rests on 
the information problem faced by the subjects. In experiments with ex-
perienced subjects or ones in which there is a strong incentive to reach 
agreement (i.e., the unanimous consent experiments), subjects generally 
do not vary their bids much from round to round because they realize 
that by so doing they would make it difficult for others to predict their 
behavior. The resulting stability in bids in such experiments allows the 
subjects to settle on the commodities that will be bought and their cost 
shares relatively easily. 
Except for the rebate property which appears to have no impact at 
all on either performance or volatility, the other control variables sig-
nificantly affect performance directly as measured by D but seemingly 
have no effect on performance as measured by P. Experience, unanimous 
consent, and the preference configuration appear to have a direct influ-
ence in locating an allocation which is dominated by fewer of the feasible 
equilibria but do not seem to affect the percentage of the total possible 
payout which a subject of either of these groups achieves. As discussed 
previously, both of these measures are arbitrary exensions of the "ef-
ficiency" criterion and do not perfectly coincide in ranking the outcomes 
of the experiments. Thus· the differences reported in Tables 8 and 9 may 
well be due to these arbitrary differences in the ranking of outcomes. 
In general, the procedures reported here-especially the unanimity 
requirement-perform surprisingly well. Even though the choice problem 
is quite difficult, the average performance level is fairly high. For ex-
ample, 15 of the 29 experiments (or 25 if we eliminate experiments in 
which at least one subject did not understand the instructions) resulted 
in allocations that are dominated by fewer than 10% of the feasible 
bundles. If the standard for success is that fewer than 20% of the bundles 
dominate the outcome, then 23 experiments were successful. Even 
though there are many Nash equilibria-especially in the unanimous 
consent experiments-the subjects still managed to settle on a bundle 
that was relatively efficient most of the time. We cannot explain why 
this should be so. Indeed, given the complicated environments in our 
experiments, this tendency is perhaps even more puzzling than the similar 
results obtained by Smith. 
APPENDIX 
To conserve on space the instructions used in all different mechanisms 
will not be reproduced here. Instead, the set of instructions for rule 3a 
using Table 1 preferences are shown and footnotes will indicate any 
variations that were used with other rules. An asterisk (*) will indicate 
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where changes were made when using Table 2 preferences to accom-
modate the fact that only four items were available to the group. 
An Experiment in Group Decision Making 
This is an experiment in the economics of group decision making. The 
instructions are simple and if you follow them carefully and make good 
decisions, you may earn a considerable amount of money which will be 
paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. 
You are a member of a group that must decide which of various items 
to purchase. Group discussion, however, will not be permitted under 
any circumstances during the experiment. If a particular item is pur-
chased by the group, it has a certain dollar value to you. If you turn to 
the last page of these instructions you will see recorded there the dollar 
values of each of the five* items (A, B, C, D, E). This value is the 
amount the experimenter will pay to you if this item is purchased at the 
conclusion of the experiment. Each group member may have a different 
set of values and these are to be considered private. You are asked not 
to reveal these numbers to anyone during the experiment. You will also 
find the cost of providing each of the five* items to the group on the last 
page of this handout. Since these are the costs to the group this infor-
mation is the same on each member's handout. 
The method by which the group will make its purchase decisions is 
as follows. There will be a sequence of no more than IO periods. In each 
period you will be asked to privately select and communicate to the 
experimenter how much you would be willing to pay or "bid" in order 
to obtain each item. At the end of each period the experimenter will list 
the total amount bid for each item by all members of the group on the 
blackboard in the front of the room. He will also list those items for 
which the total amount bid exceeds the cost of providing them. If an 
item appears on this list on the final period of the experiment, it is 
"purchased." If an item is not on this list in the final period, even if it 
appeared on the list in an earlier round, it will not be purchased. 
Bidding Rules 
In your folder you will find a set of bidding forms. At the beginning 
of each period you will be asked to fill out one of these forms. The 
information which you must fill out on each form includes: your member 
number, the period number, and the amount you are willing to pay for 
each item. The bids which you submit must satisfy the following 
requirements: 
1. In each period you may bid on as many of the five* items as you 
wish. 
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2. Your bid on any item must be in multiples of quarters. For ex-
ample, $.25, $1.50, $1.75, $3.25, or $6.00 are valid bids, but $.37, 
$1.61, $2.42, or $3.18 are not valid. 
3. You are not permitted to bid a negative amount for any item, 
although you may bid zero. 
4. In each period, the total amount which you may bid on all items 
must not exceed your allotted budget. You will find your budget 
is recorded on the last page of these instructions. This is the 
amount of money the experimenter has credited to you. You are 
not required to bid your entire budget. 
Here is an example of a list of bids which satisfy the above rules:* 
Item 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
Total Amount Bid 
Computing Your Payoff14 
Your Bid 
$30.00 
$20.00 
$15.00 Budget - $100.00 
$12.50 
$22.50 
$100.00 
Your payoff will be determined by the list of bids you have submitted 
in the final round and the list of items purchased in that round. An item 
is purchased only if the sum of the bids on that item is at least as great 
as the cost of providing it to the group. If an item is purchased, you will 
pay what you bid on that item. 
For example, if you bid $2.00 on item A, the total amount bid on item 
A is $8.00, and its cost is $6.00, the item would be purchased and you 
would have to pay $2.00 for item A. 
If an item is not purchased, you will not have to pay anything for that 
item. 
Your total payoff is computed by the following method. It is the sum 
of the values of the purchased items plus your unspent budget. Your 
unspent budget is the amount of your budget that remains after you pay 
what you bid on items that were purchased. The following example will 
help illustrate the method of calculating payoffs. 
Example. To assist you in computing your payoff we will work through 
an example* together. Suppose that the following information is furnished 
to you at the conclusion of a period. 
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ITEMS A, C AND D ARE PURCHASED 
Item Value Bid Totals Your Bid Cost 
A $5.00 $ 9.00 $3.00 $ 6.00 
B $2.00 $ 4.00 $0.00 $ 9.00 
c $6.00 $12.00 $2.00 $12.00 
D $3.00 $12.00 $4.00 $10.50 
E $2.50 $ 4.00 $1.00 $ 7.50 
Your Budget = $10.00 
Compute your payoff if the experiment were to terminate at this stage. 15 
The experimenter will come around and check your work. 
Termination 
You will have a maximum of JO periods to decide on your purchases. 
This procedure will terminate prior to this only if all group members 
agree to stop by submitting identical bids for two consecutive periods. 
If the group agrees to stop, you will be paid according to the above 
rules. However, if the group has failed to agree to stop by the end of 
period 10, you will each be paid $3.00. 16 
Once the experiment is terminated, payoffs will be made. You should 
compute the amount which is owed to you by the experimenter and it 
will be paid to you in cash at the conclusion of the experiment. Feel 
free to earn as much cash as you can. Are there any questions? 
If there are no further questions, we may begin. Remember that you 
may not communicate with each other during the experiment. Please 
decide upon your initial bids and record them on your bidding form. 
Remember that these bids are private and should not be revealed to the 
other group members. Please pass these forms to the experimenter when 
you have recorded your bids. 
NOTES 
I. A mechanism is incentive-compatible if truthful revelation of preferences is an op-
timal strategy for each agent given any configuration of preferences. This implies that each 
agent has a dominant strategy. 
2. In Ferejohn et al. (I 979a) we reported the results of an experimental analysis of two 
mechanisms in a laboratory setting. One was a laboratory analog of the choice mechanism 
(the Station Program Cooperative or SPC) utilized by the Public Broadcasting System. In 
the SPC, stations vote yes or no for each proposed program and costs are shared only 
by stations who vote yes. The procedure is iterative, and stations may change their votes 
from iteration to iteration as the number of yes votes-and hence the cost share to a 
station--changes. The procedure ends when all agents vote the same way in two consec-
utive rounds. The other procedure we have studied was a modified version of a procedure 
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found in the literature on incentive compatibility (see Green and Laffont, 1977). In this 
procedure, tax shares for each agent depend on the costs of the purchased goods and the 
bids of other agents. Neither of these mechanisms "performed" much better than the 
other in an experimental setting, although a moderate edge had to be given to the SPC 
mechanism employed on two grounds: it seemed to converge more quickly and therefore 
to be somewhat less costly to operate, and it appeared to exhibit less variance in outcomes. 
3. Alternatively, agents could submit bids on distinct packages of public goods. This, 
however, is ruled out for practical reasons since agents would be required to submit zm - 1 
bids. 
4. This nonbankruptcy constraint may introduce a significant income effect on each 
member of the collective at the boundary. To see this let J be the set of commodities to 
be produced, then each agent's preference ordering may be represented as 
L v;i + max[o, w; - L tu]. 
jEJ jd 
where t;i is the cost share of each produced commodity allocated to agent i under an 
allocation rule. For any positive private good allocation, the above preference ordering 
is linear in income and thus no income effects are present. However, when the private 
good allocation nears zero, this "kink" in the preference ordering induces a sharp income 
effect. 
5. Rules 3b and 3d are actually variants of Lindahl mechanisms. Under fairly general 
conditions in an environment with discrete public goods, Lindahl mechanisms, like auction 
mechanisms, possess Nash equilibrium Pareto-optimal allocations. 
6. For the rebate procedures a bid configuration for which the bid total for a commodity 
exceeds its costs can be an equilibrium only if exactly 1 individual has bid on the 
commodity. 
7. One feature of the experiments reported in our earlier work makes them noncom-
parable to the current experiments. Namely, subjects were told that the experiments would 
terminate either if all agents submitted identical bids for two consecutive rounds or if the 
round number exceeded some predetermined (secret) number (always 10). 
8. Table 1 preferences have several bundles for which there exist cost sharing arrange-
ments supporting a Pareto optimum. For example, BC, CD, CDE, and BDE all have many 
cost-sharing arrangements which yield a Pareto optimum. 
9. Obviously the experimental design is incomplete. More experiments per cell would 
have produced more reliable statistical results. Moreover, a greater range of variation in 
the environmental control variables is clearly desirable. Larger groups and a greater number 
of options could also be subject to experimental investigation. The difficulty with a more 
complete experimental design is, of course, its expense and complexity. To add another 
two-way treatment-such as independent variation of income distribution and preferences-
doubles the number of experiments. While we are proceeding with additional experiments, 
we believe these preliminary results provide useful information about the problem of 
designing decentralized, marketlike process for group decision making. 
10. In a subset of these experiments subjects made purchasing decisions subject to the 
restriction that at most one commodity could enter or leave the list of those provisionally 
purchased in each round. 
11. The Tobit method for estimating relationships for limited dependent variables is 
appropriate whenever the observed dependent variable cannot take on values below a 
certain threshold level. In the cases considered here either measure of performance, say 
1 - P, is a limited dependent variable with a lower limit ofO. Let Y be a linear combination 
of the independent variables B'X to which 1 - Pis related by hypothesis. Subject groups 
may differ from each other in their behavior regarding the efficiency measure for reasons 
for which differences in the independent variables do not fully account. These differences 
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are taken to be random and are representable by E, a normal random variable with mean 
0, and variance CT. The performance of a group is assumed to be given as: 
1-P=O 
1-P=Y-E 
ifY-E<O; 
if Y - E 2' 0. 
12. The appropriate estimation procedure here is the two-limit Tobit method since P 
cannot be negative or exceed 1. Because there were no observations for which P = 0, 
the single-limit Tobit method produces identical estimates as the two-limit method (see 
Rosett and Nelson, 1975). 
13. As in the previous estimation, a single-limit Tobit method was used since there 
were no observations for which D = 1. 
14. When the rebate rule was used, this section reads as follows: 
Computing Your Payoff Your payoff will be determined by the list of bids you 
have submitted in the final round and the list of items purchased in that round. An item 
is purchased only if the sum of the bids on that item is at least as great as the cost of 
providing it to the group. If the total amount bid on an item exceeds its cost, then the 
excess of bids over the cost will be rebated to members in proportion to their bids. If you 
wish to compute your rebate on an item, you may do so in the following manner: 
your bid . Your rebate = --- x (total bid - cost). 
total bid 
For example, if you bid $2.00 on item A, the total amount bid on item A is $8,00, and 
its cost is $6.00, the item would be purchased and your rebate would be: 
$2.00 Rebate = -$ - x ($8.00 - $6.00) = $.50. 
8.00 
To find your cost share for a purchased item subtract your rebate from your bid on that 
item. In this example your cost share for item A is $2.00 - $.50 = $1.50. If an item is 
not purchased your cost share is zero. 
Your total payoff is computed by the following method. It is the sum of the values of 
the purchased items plus your unspent budget. Your unspent budget is the amount of your 
budget that remains after you pay your cost shares. The following example will help 
illustrate the method of calculating payoffs. 
15. When the rebate rule was used, this sentence read: "Compute your cost share for 
each item and your payoff if the experiment were to terminate at this stage." 
16. When unanimity was not required, this paragraph read as follows: 
You will have a maximum of JO periods to decide on your purchases. This procedure 
will terminate prior to this only if all group members submit identical bids for two 
consecutive periods. 
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